THE AIRLINES' RECENT EXPERIENCE UNDER
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INTRODUCnON

No reader of newspapers need be told that the recent past has been eventful from a
labor relations point of view in the air transport industry, and many travelers by air
can recount vivid personal experiences illustrative of travel problems and inconvenience caused by strikes on the airlines.- This article describes factors underlying
these disturbances, outlines the applicable labor laws, and summarizes recent developments. First in order, however, is a brief description of those aspects of the air transport industry having a particular bearing on its labor relations:
A. Strikes are especially crippling to the airlines. Air carriers deal in services,
not goods. Consequently, they cannot build up inventories to provide revenue or
forestall loss of trade when a strike occurs. Moreover, as transportation is provided continuously, an interruption of service affects the public immediately
B. Since the transportation provided is national and international, as well as
local, airline operations take place in a variety of labor markets.
C. The industry is relatively new and dynamic, having a rapidly changing
technology. Although its routes, fares, and operations are subject to governmental regulation, it is highly competitive. Competition has been sharpened by
the Civil Aeronautics Board's policy of establishing parallel routes. One aspect
of competition is the race to acquire and put new equipment into operation. The
new equipment entails high capital expenditures and brings about a rapid rate of
obsolescence.
D. The jobs performed by the organized employees run the gamut of specialization, from highly-trained pilots to relatively untrained employees performing
cleaning services.
E. The employees are organized on a "class or craft" basis, so that each carrier
must deal with a number of unions.
* B.A. 1950, Miami University (Ohio); M.P.A. 1953, Wayne University; J.D. 5954, University of
Michigan. Member of the New York bar; General Attorney, American Airlines, Inc.
' Airline strikes forced the cancellation or disruption of travel plans of over 2,500,ooo passengers in
1958. Moreover, airline employees lost more time due to strikes in 1958 than in the previous 2o years
combined. Am TRANSPORT AssOcIATION oF AMERICA, AIR TRANSPORT FAcrs AND FIGURP.S 4 (2oth ed.
1959). The injury from strikes does not, of course, include the harassment from numerous strike threats.
See the tabulations of strikes and strike threats in Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact Approval Proceedings,

No. 9977, Joint Brief of the Airline Parties, CAB, 1959, tables 3 and 4.

'The situation is similar in other service industries. See Levinson, Railway Labor Act-The Record of
a Decade, 3 LA. L.J. r3 (1952); Tower, Labor Relations in the Broadcasting Industry, 23 LAw &
CONTEmp. PRo. 62, 63 (1958).
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I
FACTORS UNDERLYING RECENT LABOR DISTURBANCES

The introduction of jet aircraft has been a key factor in recent airline labor relations problems. Because of increased capacity, the new equipment has given rise

to alleged fears of technological unemployment, a specter periodically raised by airline
unions since the beginning of air transport servicesO These allegations supplied
arguments used to support the demands of the mechanics for severance pay and a
large wage increase, and the demands of the pilots that they be given the jobs of the
flight engineers or, in the alternative, that an additional pilot be put in the cockpit

of jets. 4 The flight engineers, of course, put up a strong defensive struggle to retain
their position
In the past, because of technological improvements and continued growth, the
air transport industry expanded very rapidly6 and was able to absorb increasing
costs. 7 Recently, however, costs have begun to outstrip growth,' and just when capital requirements for new equipment became highest, profits dipped
In z956, a general passenger fare investigation was inaugurated by the CAB.' °
Although it has dragged on for four years without a final decision, an interim fare
a Past experience in the industry has not supported claims of technological unemployment.

See note

6 infra.
' See E. B. McNATF, LAoB RELATIONS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY, 1947-1957, at 20-21 (1958).
Recent settlements provide for three pilots and a flight engineer in the cockpit of turbojet aircraft. Piston
aircraft were operated with two pilots and a flight engineer. A description of the historical and functional
relationship between flight engineers and pilots is contained in the reports of PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY
BoAnD No. 120, REPORT (1958); PRESIDENTIAL EmERGENCY BOARD No. 121, REPORT (x958).
'For a report of continuing friction, see N.Y. Times, March 16, 1959, P. 53, col. I. The Wall Street
Journal for March iz, 1959, p. i, contains a report of various personnel problems and complaints resulting

from the introduction of jet aircraft.
' The growth of the air transport industry is depicted in the following chart from AIR TRANSPORT
ASSOCIATION OF AMERIcA, op. cit. supra note x, at 8:

THE AIRLINE STORY
Ever Increasing Usefulness Over the Years
All classes of
Certificated Air Carriers

1939

23
Number of Airlines....
Cities Served (exclud"
288
AigAlsan points)I
Aircratn Service ..... 347
Seats Available (Daily).
5,100
Cruising Speed of
Fastest Transport...
220 mph
Number of People
Employed .........13,300

1949
45

1958

638
1.083
35,900

703
1.900
103,700

315 mph

590 mph

76,000

146,000

55

All classes of
Certificated Air Carriers

1939

1949

1958

Total Airline Payrolls.. $24,000,000 $349,000,000 $950,000,00G
U.S. Mail Ton Miles.. 8,610,000
61,144,000 177,430,000
Number of Passengers
16,723,000 49,075,000
Carried ..........1,864.000
5,81
Average Fare..........5.621
6.231
Ton Miles of Freight
Carried ............
2,713,0001 112,500,000 501,591,000

I Freight and Express combined.

2 Early figures for Alaska not available but in 1958 there were 268 points served.

'For a discussion of this, see Suspended Passenger Fare Increase Case, No. 8613, Order No. E-h8z2,
CAB, Sept. 25, 1957, PP. 17-29, particularly charts X, 2, and 4(a)-(d).

a See Interim Fare Increase Case, No. 9288, Order No. E-122o3, CAB, Feb. 25, 1958, p. 7-

'Id. at 5-6, and app. C.
1"

General Passenger Fare Investigation, No. 8oo8, Order No. E-1o279, CAB, May 1o, 1956.
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increase was granted11 and surcharges for jet service have been authorized 1 Despite
constantly improving service and higher costs, the average fare paid by the passenger
for air transportation has not increased in the postwar period-partly because of the
introduction of coach service in 1948.3
In 1957 and 1958, the financial picture looked particularly bleak, and while the
resul-ts for the end of 1958 and for 1959 have shown improvement, there is no clear
indication that the airlines are out of the woods yet" 8
These financial pressures have resulted in part from the demands of employee
groups. As shown in appendix A at the end of this article, the increases in average
pay of mechanics during the past twelve years have substantially exceeded increases
in the Consumer Price Index plus an annual productivity factor, and this has not been
passed on to the consumer. Recent settlements have brought the pay level of
mechanics even higher. Similarly, as a result of negotiations recently concluded, a
senior pilot's compensation may run up to $33,000 per year, exclusive of substantial
fringe benefits including, in some cases, more than two weeks' free time at home
every month.' 4
These, then, are salient factors presently affecting the labor relations of the airlines.
Having them in mind will make more meaningful some of the aspects of the Railway
Labor Act discussed in the next section.
II
THE OPERATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT

A. Legislative Background
The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 to regulate the labor relations of the
railroads.' It is developed from earlier legislation dating back to 18881 In 1934, its
'Interim Fare Increase Case, No. 9288, Order No. E-I22o3, CAB, Feb. 25, 1958.
2See Additional Charges Proposed by American Airlines, Inc. for Boeing 707 Jet Aircraft, No. 10142,
Order No. E-13 3 9 5 , CAB, Jan. I6, 1959, and id., Order No. E-1 3 4 17, Jan. 22, 1959, in which the Board
states that the extra charge is not for jet service as such, but for the "more deluxe type of service."
" See note 6 supra. App. A contains an indication of the trend in revenue-mile yields since 1948.
" In General Passenger Fare Investigation, No. 8oo8, Initial Decision, CAB, May 27, x959, pp. 167,
177, Examiner Ralph L. Wiser concluded that "the domestic trunkline air-transport industry failed to earz
a fair return in 1957 and 1958 by any reasonable standard of consideration," and that "if' 1957 and x958,
both yearly and 5-year averages of profits were well below a reasonable level."
" See Sheehan, What's Eating the Airline Pilots?, Fortune, April 1959, pp. 122, 123. Historically, one reason for the high level of pilot compensation was the expectation that they would be
compelled to retire at a comparatively early age. In PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY BOARD No. 36, REPORT
i, 12 (1946), for example, it is stated that "Expert evidence indicates that the active flying life of an
air-line pilot may extend up to 5o years. . . . [While] flying careers may be longer than generally
believed . . . the chance of continuing beyond 5o is doubtful." That emergency board proceeding ini
volved problems in the transition from two to four-engine equipment in 1946. Before World War II, it
was tliought that pilots would have to end active flying even sooner. That has not proved to be
the case in practice. At present, there are a number of airline pilots over 6o; and, in fact, two adjustment

bdards recently ruled that a carrier could not impose a compulsory retirement age of 6o on its pilots,
An action for a declaratory judgment that such a ruling is erroneous and void has been commenced by'
Western Air Lines against the Air Line Pilots Association 'in the United States District Court for the
Soutiern District of California.
1544 Star 577,'45 U.S.C. § 151-63 (1952). The constitutionality of the prohibition against inter-
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procedures for dealing with certain types of disputes were strengthened.lt The Act
was made applicable to the airlines by the addition of title two in 193608 -There
have been no statutory changes since then, other than an amendment in 1951 author-

izing union-shop agreements and the check-off of union dues.' 9
B. Coverage
The Act covers air and rail carriers in interstate commerce, 20 including state22
owned railroads 21 and foreign carriers with employees based in the United States,
whether the services performed are directly connected with transportation or not 3
It does not cover employees based in foreign countries.24 "Subordinate officials" are
25
included in the definition of "employees.
ference with union organization was upheld in Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930). Although the Act had the approval of
representatives of both the railroads and the unions, House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Railway Labor Disputes, H.R. RaP. No. 328, 69 th Cong., ist Sess. (1926), Donald Richberg and David
Lilienthal, his associate, have been referred to as its draftsmen.
1225 Stat. 501 (1888); Erdman Act, 30 Stat. 424 ([898); Newlands Act, 38 Stat. 103 (1913); Adamson Act, 39 Stat. 721 (1916); General Order No. 8 (Feb. 21, 1918); Transportation Act of x92o, 41
Stat. 469. These earlier statutes are summarized in NATIONAL MEDIATION BoARD, ADmINIsRATION OF
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT BY THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, 1934-1957, app. B (1958) [hereinafter
cited as NMB REPORT]; and the circumstances of their passage, as well as the passage of Railway Labor
Act, are described in LEONAR.D A. LEcIrr, EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 14-46 (1955).
27 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
See Lacsrr, op. cit. supra note 16, at 73. The constitutionality of an enforceable duty to bargain was upheld in Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553, 557 (1937).
1 §§ 201-08, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (952).
§ 2, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1952). The check-off provision relates to
"any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225 (1956), holds that the amendment is coistitutional and that it pre-empts state right-to-work
laws. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, io8 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. I959), from which an appeal
is pending to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that a union-shop agreement under the Railway Labor Act violated constitutional rights if the dues collected were used to foster programs and
ideologies opposed by some of the employees.
§ i, First, 49 Stat. 1191 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § I5I (1952).
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
"5 See Rutas Aereas Nacionales, S.A. v. Edwards, 244 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Decker v. Linea
sAeropostal Venezolana, 258 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
23
See Biswanger v. Boyd, 4o L.R.R.M. 2267 (D.D.C. 1957), and NMB Case Nos. C-25o5 (1956) and
h
R-3321 (I959). But Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Jackson, I85 F.2d 74 (8t Cir. i§5o), cert. denied, 342
are not within the overtime
activities
in
transportationf
U.S. 812 (1951), holds that employees not engaged
pay exemption for Railway Labor Act employees in § I 3 (b)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52
Stat. 1o67 (1938), as amended, 63 Stat. 917 (949), 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1952). The NLRB follows a
policy of not asserting jurisdiction in doubtful cases unless it has been declined by the NMB. See
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 47 N.L.R.B. 498 (1943); Pan American World Airways, Inc., Guided Missiles
Range Division, 115 N.L.R.B. 493 (956); Interior Enterprises, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. No. i8o (1959). See
Fenton, The Taft-Hartley Act and the Airlines Industry, address before the Personnel Relations Conference of the Air Transport Association, Oct. 1, 1958.
"Airline Dispatchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849
(i9g5); Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 269 F.2d 17o (8th Cir.
x959); and Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 369
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (appeal pending). For a summary of the NMB's views concerning jurisdictional problems,'see NMB REPORT 6-8.
" § 1, Fifth, 44 Stit. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). In Case No. R-2107 (949), the NMB held
that mechanical foremen are "employees" for the purposes of the -Act, but Case' -No. C-2783 (I959)
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Air and rail carriers may seek protection against secondary boycotts under section
8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act,2" but prior to the passage of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of I959,268 it was problematical

whether relief would be afforded. 26" One of the purposes of the new law is to make
the secondary boycott prohibitions clearly applicable to such carriers and their em27
ployees.
C. Representation
The Railway Labor Act protects employees in the selection of bargaining representatives; 28 and the National Mediation Board, charged with settling representation
disputes,29 interprets this protection as requiring it to promote the organization of
employees. 0 One curious manifestation of this interpretation is that the NMB representation election ballots contain no space for a negative vote. 3' Consequently, employees not wishing union representation must either not vote or vote an invalid ballot
by marking "No Union" on it0'
Before conducting an election, the NMB determines the system-wide "class or
indicates that such employees are not included within the scope of an airline mechanics certification. The
application of the Act to middle management personnel is criticized in Dale & Raimon, Management
Unionism and Public Policy on the Railroads and the Airlines, I1 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 55! (1958). By
way of contrast, the National Labor Relations Act excludes "any individual employed as a supervisor."
2
2(3),
6i Stat. 138 (I947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
2849 Star. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1952). See Local Union No. 25, Teamsters v.
New York, N.H., & H. R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).

2O.y3 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. H3 401-531 (Supp. 1959).
..bThe NLRB took the position that § 8(b) (4) (A) did not protect carriers from secondary boycotts.

See Local No. 2o5, Teamsters, 122 N.L.R.B. No. 248 (1959). Some of the courts did not agree with this
position, however, nor did the NLRB general counsel. See W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.2d
129 ( 5 th Cir. 1957); Knapp v. United Steelworkers of America, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,8o6 (D.C. Minn.
1959).

"'Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 704(a), 73 Stat. 525, 29 U.S.C.A
1s5 8(b)(4) (A) (Supp. 1959), does this by changing "employer" to "person." See S. REP. No. 187,
86th Cong., ist Sess. (z959). Title VII of this Act, which amends the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947, 6i Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), is otherwise inapplicable to Railway
Labor Act industries, but the other 6 titles are. Those titles contain a "bill of rights" for union members;
reporting requirements for employers, unions, and labor relations consultants; provisions relating to union
trusteeships, elections, and fiduciary duties; and miscellaneous matters.
§ 2, Third and Fourth, 44 Stat. 577 (2926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (952).
2' Ibid. Since that section refers to a representation dispute "among a carrier's employees," the NMB
takes the position that carriers may not institute or be a formal party in such proceedings, although it may
"in its discretion hold a public hearing . . . at which the carrier concerned is usually invited to present
factual information." NMB REPORT 4, 29. As a consequence, no means is afforded whereby the employer can directly challenge the majority status of a union seeking to bargain or protect itself against
jurisdictional disputes. Under the amended National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1952), employers are expressly given the right to petition for an election. For criticism
of the absence of a similar provision in the Railway Labor Act, see Dale & Raimon, supra note 25, at 571.
50

See NMB REPORT 15.
IId. at 29.

The NMB requires that a majority of the eligible employees cast valid ballots in order for a union
to be certified as a bargaining agent. See S 2, Fourth, 44 Star. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. S 152 (1952).
Ballots marked "No Union" are considered void, so are not counted toward the majority of valid ballot&
required. See NMB REPORT 6-1i8; NMB Case No. R-3273 (1958).
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craft" of employees to be represented.

3
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What constitutes a craft or class is a difficult

question in some cases, 34 and the Board has placed a narrow interpretation on its
authority to make such determinations. 35 Because of the class or craft criterion for
the organization of bargaining units, a carrier may have to deal with more than

half a dozen different unions having a variety of differing objectives. 36

Once a bargaining agent has been designated by the Board (or recognized by
the carrier without an election), disputes between the union and carrier fall into two
categories, in the parlance which has developed under the Railway Labor Act. Controversies over rates of pay, rules, or working conditions in the negotiation of a new
contract are referred to as "major" disputes; these are distinguished from "minor"
disputes, which involve employee grievances or the interpretation or application of an

effective agreement 3 7 Consistent with its primary purpose of "'avoid[ing] any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein" within the
framework of collective bargaining," s the Act has elaborate machinery for the
settlement of both types of disputes, as described in the next two sections.
D. Minor Disputes

Minor disputes usually are processed through three steps and then, if unresolved,
are submitted to an adjustment board for a "final and binding" award.3 9
The National Railroad Adjustment Board processes railroad minor disputes. It

is a permanent body of thirty-six members divided into four divisions. The railroads
and the unions "national in scope" each designate half of the members. Each division

has jurisdiction over disputes involving specified categories of employees4 ° Although
title two of the Act authorizes a National Air Transport Adjustment Board for air

carriers, 41 it has never been established.4 2 Instead, it is customary for the air carriers'
working agreements to provide for system boards of adjustment having a similar
jurisdiction.43 Such boards have representatives of both the carrier and union, but
3"§ 2, Ninth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952). (This also varies from the National
Labor Relations Act, where an "appropriate" unit under § 9, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b) (1952), may be an "employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.") This section
authorizes the NMB to "appoint a committee of three neutral persons who after hearings shall within ten
days designate the employees who may participate in the election." This procedure was used for the first
time when, on Nov. 17, 1959, the Board appointed such a committee in" connection with the Air Line
Pilots Association petition to represent "flight deck crew members" of United Air Lines. NMB File No.
2946. This proceeding is another branch of the dispute between the pilots' and the flight engineers'
unions.
"'See NMB REPoRT 19-22.
"Ild. at 2.5. See NMB Case No. R-2o7 (1937).

See also note 25 supra.

"5 As one observer has said (in an unpublished speech), "The multiplicity of contracting parties in
the airline industry has all the disadvantages but, so far as I can see, none of the attractiveness of a harem.
There is constant turmoil not only between the airline and its polygamous flock but also between the
jealous rivals themselves."
"' See Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-24 (1945).
s § 2(l), 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 15a (1952).

ss §3(m), 44 Stat. 578 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1952).
40 Ibid.
" § 205, 49 Stat. 119o (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
" See NMB REPoRT 29.
43 § 204, 49 Stat. ix89 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1952).
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the disputes usually are settled by a neutral referee who is either agreed to by the
parties or selected by the NMB. Neutrals chosen for the adjustment boards of air
carriers function much like regular labor arbitrators. The NRAB, however, since
it is a continuing body, has developed characteristics of its own.44
E. Major Disputes
As to major disputes, the parties first bargain without assistance following a
thirty-day notice of opening on existing contracts. 4 If an impasse results, the NMB
steps in, either on its own motion or at the request of either party.40 Should agreement still not be reached, the Board proffers arbitration, 47 and if that is refused (as
it usually is) ,48 as a last resort the Board may (but need not) recommend the appointment of a presidential emergency board.49 The emergency board makes an investigation, perhaps attempting to mediate the dispute itself, and then reports to the
President. The parties are required to maintain the status quo 0 until thirty days
have elapsed after the emergency board's report, following which the union may
strike and the carrier may change conditions of employment and presumably hire
replacements. Theoretically, the carrier also could resort to a lockout at that time,
but as a practical matter-aside from competitive considerations-this is not feasible
because of its obligations under unexpired contracts with other unions.
Major dispute proceedings often consume a great deal of time. The recent controversy between six air carriers and the International Association of Machinists is a
case in point. 1 The agreements with the IAM expired on October 1, 1957. Approximately thirty days prior thereto the unions and companies exchanged proposals and began negotiating. Negotiations having proved fruitless, the services of
" For appraisals of the NRAB, see Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machinery: A Critical
Analysis, 5 INn. & LAD. REL. REV. 365 (1952); Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A
Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YALE LJ. 567 (937).
4r § 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (952).
§§ 5, 6, 44 Stat. 580-82 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1952).
S§.5, 44 Stat. 580, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (952).

"E.g., 24 NMB ANN. RE. 25 (958) lists only one major dispute arbitration for the air transport
industry in 1957, and that did not involve the arbitration of an entire contract dispute. It originally was
hoped that there would be "recourse to arbitration in practically every instance where the mediators cannot
bring about an agreement." See testimony of Donald R. Richberg, in Hearings Before the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7180, Railroad Labor Disputes, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 103
(1926). TWA and the stewardesses' union agreed in November z959 to submit their major dispute to
arbitrator David Cole.
"Under § 10, 44 Stat. 586 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § x6o (1952), the NMB notifies the President only if
the dispute, in its judgment, threatens "substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as
to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service," and the President then appoints
the emergency board "in" his discretion." During and after the io8-day strike by the pilots against
Western Air Lines in 1958, there was considerable criticism of the NMB's failure to recommend the appointment of an emergency board.
0, 44 Stat. 586 (1926), 45-U.S.C. § 16o (952), provides that "no change, except by agree0§
ment, shall be made by the parties to -he controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose."
Under § 5, 44 Stat. 580 (1926), 45 U.S. C. § S55 (952), the parties may make "no change . . . in the
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute
arose" during mediation or for 30 days thereafter.
" The six airlines were Capital, Eastern, National, Northeast, Northwest, and Trans World.
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the NMB were invoked, and continued for several months. The Mediation Board
then proffered arbitration, which was refused, and on February 27, 1958, the President created Emergency Board Number 122 by executive order. That Board first
met on March ii for organizational purposes. Hearings commenced April 15,
1958 and continued for a total of sixty days thereafter, closing on July 29, 1958.
The Board (comprised of Howard A. Johnson, retired chief justice of the Supreme
Court of Montana, as Chairman; Dr. Paul N. Guthrie, professor of labor economics
at the University of North Carolina; and Francis J. Robertson, an attorney from
Washington, D.C.) heard at length representatives of the parties and expert witnesses. Seven thousand, one hundred and sixty-two pages of testimony were taken,
and approximately 970 exhibits, containing some 5,000 pages, were received in evidence. Following the hearings, the Board met with the parties informally in an
unsuccessful attempt to bring about a settlement. It then produced a report and
recommendations on September 15, 1958. That report contained iio printed pages. 52
The union had sought more and the carriers, less, than the Emergency Board
recommended. The carriers, nevertheless, announced that they would accept the
recommendations, but the IAM said merely that it would consider them as a "basis
for further negotiations."53 Negotiations thereupon continued for thirty days, and
a series of strikes followed. 54 The ultimate settlements were substantially in excess
of the Emergency Board's recommendations. 5
The question arises as to just what the President is supposed to do after receiving
a report from an emergency board. When the Railway Labor Act was passed, a
great deal of pious confidence in the salutary effect of public opinion was expressed.
In fact, Donald Richberg, counsel to the railroad unions and chief draftsman of the
Act, stated that because of public opinion, it would be difficult for the parties not
to accept emergency board recommendations.5" In practice, however, such recommendations have not been the basis for settlement, but merely "a springboard from
which [the unions] could obtain further concessions." 57 "For over a decade the
significant collective bargaining developments have usually occurred after the report
'
was issued and found unacceptable." 8
As the NMB observed in 1953:59
Means must be found to focus attention on the reports of Presidential emergency boards
in such manner that they will afford the basis of settlements without further prolonged
negotiations and threats of strike action, if not actual strikes. Otherwise, the role to be
;3 PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY BoARD No. 122, REPORT (1958).

" N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1958, p. 38, col. 7.
" Capital was struck 37 days; Eastern, 35 days; and Trans World, 16 days by the IAM. The strikes
took place between Sept. 15, 1958 and the end of the year.
" The Emergency Board recommended an increase of approximately 23 cents per hour spread over 2
years, and the settlements were 44 cents over 3 years (the Northwest settlement was 41 cents).
Co

Hearings, supra note 48, at I8-19.

CT JACOB

J. KAUFMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 154 (1954).

supra.
" LECHT, op. cit. supra note 16, at 6.
50 19 NMB ANN. REP. 7 (1953).

See note 53
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played by such boards in the settlement of disputes in the transportation industry, as
envisioned by labor, management and the Congress at the passage of this Act will lose its
vitality and value.
At one time, the President could seize the carriers to prevent interruption to vital
transportation services,' but Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer"' cast doubt on
his authority to do so in the absence of an emergency 2 or specific congressional
approval. 2 a
F. "Other" Disputes
Several recent Railway Labor Act cases indicate that there are disputes which
are neither major-since they do not involve rates of pay, rules or working conditions-nor minor-since they do not involve grievances or ...the interpretation
or application of agreementsP Such disputes apparently refer to matters specifically
reserved to management as "subject to its continuing authority to supervise and
0°4
direct the manner of rendition of [an employee's] service.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. New York CentralRI. Co.", holds that a
controversy concerning the closing of railroad yards in Toledo falls into the "other"
dispute category. The railroad, therefore, was not obligated to process it as a
grievance or to bargain about closing the yards. 0 Moreover, as it was not considered
a "labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 7 the federal court was not ousted
by that act of jurisdiction to issue an injunction. 8
" See In re Debs, 156 U.S. 564 (1895).
a6343 U.S. 579 (1952)" A 1916 statute gives the President authority in time of war to "take possession of all or any
part of any system of transportation to transport troops, war material, and equipment, or for other
purposes related to the emergency." 39 Stat. 645, as amended, 7oA Stat. 266, 587 (x956), io U.S.C.
§ 4742, 9742 (Supp. V, 1958). See United States v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp.
485 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948), vacated and remanded for mootness, 174 F.2d 16o
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 872 (1949); United States v. Switchmen's Union of North America,
97 F. Supp. 97 (W.D.N.Y. i95o).
"' S. 8o, 86th Cong., ist Sess. 0959), introduced by Sen. Holland, of Florida, would have authorized
the President to appoint a board of arbitrators for threatened airline strikes. The board could make
binding awards on the issues in dispute, and strikes or lockouts would be prohibited. This bill has not
been enacted.
03See note 37 supra.
, §§ i, Fifth and 201, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 49 Stat. 1191 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § I51, 181 (1952).
as 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1958>.
as246 F.2d at 118. Cf. Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 ( 4 th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958), where the issue was framed
as a minor dispute, since the carrier had elected to treat it as such by instituting adjustment board proceedings.
67 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).

"An additional question considered by the court was whether there was any basis for federal jurisdiction over the subject matter under § 1337 of the Judicial Code, 62 Stat. 93r (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1952), since no specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act were involved. Following Toledo, Peoria
& Western Ry. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 132 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other
grounds, 321 U.S. 50 (944), the court held (Judge, now Justice, Stewart dissenting) that its jurisdiction
was based on the threatened interference with the common carrier's federal right and duty to provide
facilities for interstate commerce. 246 F.2d at 122.

RAILwAY LABOR AcT

31

And in Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Order of Railroad Telegraphers,69
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enjoined a strike over a carrier's "central
agency plan," which resulted in the laying off of employees, on the ground that the
union could not force the carrier to agree not to abolish positions without its consent. Like the "Toledo Yard" case discussed above, the Chicago & North Western
case involves essentially a featherbedding situation ("many station agents were receiving a full day's pay for twelve to thirty minutes' work"). While proposals
concerning stabilization of employment such as severance pay, supplemental unemployment compensation benefits, and guaranteed employment might be legitimate
objectives of collective bargaining, the court distinguished them from the situation
before it as not vesting "indefinite retroactive veto power over abolition of positions
[but] are expressly limited to prospective periods of short duration." The court
went on to say: 7°
It appears clear that the effect of the Union's proposal, if accepted, would place in its
hands the power to prevent any undertaking by North Western to meet competition by
modernizing its operations in the light of technological development, and fulfilling its
obligation of operating efficiently and economically for the benefit of itself, its employees,
and the public. Ultimately the Union could even bring about a situation where the railroad itself might be forced out of business or so crippled financially that all employees,
including the Union's members, would suffer. This contract proposal, if accepted, would"
enable the Union to control the pace of North Western's compliance with the Commission
orders aforesaid.
The proposed contract change in the case before us represents an attempt to usurp
legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of business judgment with respect
to the most economical and efficient conduct of its operations. It is perhaps significant
that on oral argument, counsel for the Union expressed the opinion that a demand for
veto over discontinuing trains, while less reasonable than that proposed here, would constitute a bargainable issue under the Railway Labor Act.

[t]he fact that other carriers may have submitted to unlawful demands does not change
the character of such demands. A carrier may not escape its obligations in bargaining them
away.
The court in the Chicago & North Western case relied in part upon the distincton made by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Borg-Warner71 between subjects of
mandatory and permissive bargaining. Although the Borg-Warnercase was decided
under the National Labor Relations Act, both acts impose the duty to bargain upon
72
the parties.
264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 8o (1959).
I7od.at 258-59.
71 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
There the Court held that the employer's insistence that provisions for a
strike ballot and for recognition of the local rather than the international be written in the agreement
amounted to a refuaal to bargain, since those matters were outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.
72Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (937), is the leading case holding

that there is an enforceable duty to bargain under the Railway Labor Act. §§ 9(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act make it an unfair labor practice for employers or unions to refuse to
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Other union demands which might fall within the "other" dispute category are
those concerning "the type of product to be produced, the location of plants, the installation of new machinery and equipment,"' and those which discriminate against
groups of employees. 74 Demands relating to supervisory personnel (other than the
"subordinate officials" specified in section one, Fifth) also may not require bargaining.73
It is not clear whether a union can insist on demands giving rise to jurisdictional
disputes affecting the jobs of other groups of employees. General Committee of
Adjustments v. Missouri-Kansas-TexasRR.7 0 suggests that the federal courts have
no jurisdiction over such matters because they are solely within the province of the
NMB.7 7 In that case, however, the NMB had mediated the challenged agreement,
and the result might have been different if it had not participated. 7 s Otherwise, the
holding seems inconsistent in principle with the cases cited above79 and Virginian
Ry. Co. v. System FederationNo. 40.80
bargain. 49 Stat. 452 (i935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952). Section 8(d)
defines the scope of the duty to bargain as including "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." 49 Stat. 452 (x935), as amended, 6x Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 15 8(d) (1952).
Since the duty under the Railway Labor Act relates to "rates of pay, rules and working conditions," § 2,
First, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § I5 (1952), it has been suggested that the bargaining duty under
that Act has a narrower scope than the duty under the National Labor Relations Act. See Inland Steel Co.
v. NLRB, 17o F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). On the general
subject, see Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 7 HAav. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
'3 Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34, 41
( 4 th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958).
"See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood
of L.F. & E., 338 U.S. 232 (1949).

" Cf. NLRB v. Retail Clerks, 2xi F.2d 759 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 839 (1954); Ohio Power
Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, 4r Cal. 2d 567, 261 P.2d 721 (953); Kerkemeyer v. Midkiff, 299 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1957).
76 320 U.S. 323 (1943).

"Perhaps of some significance is the fact that the M-K-T case was decided the same day (and the
opinion written by the same Justice (Douglas)) as Switchmen's Union of North America v. NMB, 320
U.S. 297 (1943), in which the Court held that no appeal may be taken from NMB certifications. The
certification" of a union would seem to be different from the Board's mediation of an agreement, however,
which was involved in the M-K-T case. Curiously, Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 239
(i95o),.also denies relief, but on the ground that the adjustment board (rather than the NMB) has exclusive jurisdiction over jurisdictional disputes. In the Slocum case, however, the issue arose as a minor
dispute involving a determination of the work covered in the labor agreements. As should be readily
apparent from their form of organization, adjustment boards are not capable of dealing satisfactorily with
disputes between a carrier and two different unions over the same matter. See Union R.R. Co. v. NRAB,
17o F. Supp. 281 (N.D. Ill. 1958), for an example of the difficult problems created when solution to jurisdictional disputes is sought through adjustment boards. Experience has by this time made it clear that as
a practical matter, there is no administrative remedy under the Railway Labor Act which protects carriers
(or interstate commerce) from jurisdictional disputes--as there is for other industries under the National
Labor Relations Act. See also Rolfes v. Dwellingham, 198 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1952).
Cf. Texlite, Inc., xi 9 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1958), enforced, 266 F.2d 349 (sth Cir. 1959).
"See note 75 supra.
so 300 U.S. 515 (1937). This case holds the duty to bargain with the bargaining agent designated
under § 2, Ninth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952), to be judicially enforceable. That section
"imposes the affirmative duty to treat only with the true representative, and hence the negative duty to
treat with no other." 300 U.S. at 548. (Emphasis added.) Cf. Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co.,
349 U.S. 366 (1955). Treating jurisdictional demands as outside the area of required bargaining would
seem appropriate, especially in view of the fact that carriers have not been permitted to institute § 2,
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Since the Railway Labor Act contains no procedures for the settlement of "other"
disputes, the courts are primarily responsible for resolving the legal problems which
may arise. The next section deals with the role of the courts under other provisions

of the Railway Labor Act.
G. The Role of the Courts
The most obvious role of the courts concerns those matters for which jurisdiction

is specifically conferred by the Railway Labor Act: penalties for noncompliance with
provisions giving employees the right to organize without interference and prohibiting, carriers from unilaterally changing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions

except as provided in the Act;"' enforcement of adjustment board awards; 82 and
supervision of arbitration proceedings8 3

Unlike the National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act authorizes no
administrative body to undertake enforcement proceedings; the parties must commence their own actions to enforce rights under adjustment board awards or NMB

certifications.8 4 Private lawsuits in the federal courts, therefore, have assumed an
important role in enforcing rights and duties under the Act,85 and it has been

established that equitable relief is available in the federal courts in such cases, despite
the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 8
Ninth proceedings. If bargaining is not required on such demands, the union would then have to go
to the NMB for a § 2, Ninth determination. It seems obviously in the public interest to have such
matters settled by administrative determination rather than by resort to economic warfare, and this is
consistent with the Railway Labor Act's objective of minimizing interruptions to commerce. § 2,
First, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952). Although the conflict between the pilots and the
flight engineers has been the most acute jurisdictional dispute during the past two years, jurisdictional disputes are a continuing general problem for the airlines.
81 § 2, Tenth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
8 § 3, First (p), 44 Stat. 578 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1952). If the adjustment board has not
made an enforceable order, however, there can be no judicial enforcement. See Bates v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 273 (D.C. Minn. 1959). This section of the Act gives United States district
courts jurisdiction in suits by employees to enforce adjustment board awards. (Carriers are not given
a corollary right of enforcement.) In such actions, the findings and order of the adjustment board are
"prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." § 3, First (m), however, makes such a determination
"final and binding" upon the parties, "except insofar as [it] shall contain a money award." The Supreme
Court has held that these provisions make an adjustment board award "final and binding" if a money
claim of an employee is denied, but subject to judicial review if such a claim is granted. In Union
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Price, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,559 (r959), Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court,
observed: "The disparity in judicial review of Adjustment Board orders, if it can be said to be unfair
at all, was explicitly created by Congress, and it is for Congress to say whether it ought to be removed."
§ 201, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 18I (952), makes § 3 inapplicable to air carriers, but
§ 204, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1952), requires such carriers to establish adjustment boards
having jurisdiction "not exceeding" the jurisdiction of the railroad boards.
"' §§ 7, 8, 9, 44 Stat. 582-85 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 157, 158 (1952).
84 See, e.g., Switchmen's Union of North America v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
"The United States district courts have general jurisdiction under §§ 1331 and 1337 of the Judicial
Code, 62 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C.

§§

r331, 1337 (952).

Jurisdiction apparently also lies in the

state courts in some matters. Cf. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 927 (1957);
National Airlines, Inc., v. Metcalf, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,737 (Fla. D.C. App. 1959).
"See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federal No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (I937); Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Indiana Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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Equitable relief has been granted to prevent interference or coercion in the selection of bargaining representatives; 8 7 to enforce the duty to bargain with certified repre-

sentatives; ss to prevent discrimination in the representation of employees;80 to prevent strikes over minor disputes; 90 and to prevent strikes during the completion of

the major dispute procedures."
well as damages.

8

Declaratory relief might also be available,

2

as

Prior resort to the appropriate administrative agency is a neces-

"T Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 28X U.S. 548 (1930).
Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 US. 515 (x937).

8

"' See the discussion in the next paragraph.
"0Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 30 ('957).

As

indicated above, the adjustment board is the agency established under the Railway Labor Act for the
sittlement of minor disputes. It has been held, therefore, that an injunction to restrain a strike over a
dispute coming within the jurisdiction of an adjustment board should not be conditioned upon restoration
by the carrier of the status quo ante if the dispute concerns the carrier's right to take unilateral action.
Otherwise, the court, rather than the adjustment board, would be, in effect, passing on the merits of the
dispute. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 266 F.2d 335 ( 5 th
Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 81o (1959); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Transport Workers'
Union, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,8x9 (2d Cir. 1959); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Transport Workers' Union, 38
CCH Lab. Cas. 65,850 (ED. Pa. 1959).
" American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, 169 F. Supp. 777, (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association (W.D. Me. 1959); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
Teamsters (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Cf. Butte, Anaconda & P. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of L.F. & E., 268 F.2d
54 ( 9 th Cir. 1959). In Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
248 F.2d 34, 46 ( 4 th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958), the union alternatively took the
position that a major dispute was involved. Although minor disputes may be processed through to a
"final and binding" award, major disputes must ultimately be settled by agreement of the parties (or by
voluntary arbitration). Injunctive relief in major disputes, therefore, goes only to preserving the stdtus
quo during completion of statutory procedures and cooling-off periods, so that the parties may thereby
be induced to agree without resorting to economic "self-help." See Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945)- In Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Order of Railroad Telegraphers, 36 CCH Lab. Cas.
65,103 (N.D. I1. z958), rev'd on other grounds, 264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 361 U.S. 809 (1959), the question arose as to whether the court could preserve the
status quo by restraining a strike in a major dispute only for the cooling-off period following the NMB's
proffer of arbitration, or whether a new status quo period was started later when the Board had intervened in an emergency effort to avert a strike. The court held that the emergency mediation gave rise
to a new status quo period.
"3 See Akron, Canton & Youngstown Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 215 F.2d 423 (7th Cir.), judgment vacated
and remanded on representation of mootness by respondent's counsel, 348 U.S. 893 (954); Felter v.
Southern Pacific Co., 358 U.S. 812 (1959). Declaratory relief has been denied on the ground that an
administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over the question involved. See General Committee of
Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943); Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co.,
3 39 U.S. 239 (1950). Declaratory relief apparently also would not be available where there is a possibility that the problem will be solved by an administrative determination or by an enforcement proceeding.
See Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 5941), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 319 U.S. 732 (1943). Cf. Whitehouse'v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 349 U.S. 366 (1955). The
courts perhaps have been too sparing in the granting of declaratory relief in such cases. As Judge Dimock
said in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents Int. Union, 169 F. Supp. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1959):
"It seems to me that courts in exercising their discretion in declaratory judgment cases ought
to be particularly liberal where labor relations are involved. The most serious defect in the current trial-by-battle method of resolving disagreements between labor and management is that the
method has no natural tendency to attain a reasonable result. The courts should welcome the
opportunity to act in every case where, under the law, they can substitute a decision based on
reason for one based upon the relative might of the contenders."
" See Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
949 (1958) (under state law).
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Venue lies wherever the labor organ-

ization or carrier sued has a place of business."
The courts have asserted jurisdiction to prevent racial discrimination, even though
the Railway Labor Act does not expressly confer jurisdiction or require a union
not to discriminate." The theory of such relief is that the duty not to discriminate
is implicit in the privileges which the Act confers upon unions9 T and that the courts
8
should assert jurisdiction because of the lack of an administrative remedy
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the rule in these cases applies to other
than racial discrimination, 9 and the lower courts are divided on the question'
An exceedingly complex body of law has developed concerning adjustment board
proceedings. The most challenging current problems have to do with (a) the extent
to which union discrimination (racial or otherwise) is a basis for judicial review or
reversal of adjustment board awards, 1 1 and (b) the availability of a state cause of
" In Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 927 (r957), injunctive relief was denied
because the plaintiff had not instituted minor dispute proceedings at the time. See also American Air
Export & Import Co. v. O'Neill, 221 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1954). But Felter v. Southern Pacific Co.,
358 U.S. 812 (1959), indicates that prior resort to an adjustment board is not required where the
question is one of legality under the Act. Cf. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria &
Western R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (i944) (refusal to accept proffer of arbitration).
" See the discussion of this question in American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, 169
F. Supp. 777, 780-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In that case, the court held that the union could be sued
in New York, where it had an office, even though its principal office was irn Chicago. Judge Bryan
thought the result justified by analogy to the general venue provisions respecting suits against corporations, 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952), and the similar provision for suits against
unions in § 301(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 6r Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952),
as well as being "in accord with the practical realities." Even if the view is taken *that venue lies only
where the union has its principal office, Graham v. Brotherhood of L.F. &E., 175 F.2d 8o2 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 232 (1949), a class action apparently may be utilized to sue elsewhere.
See Griffin v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 88 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. IL. 1949); Cherico v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
" See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (i957); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of L.F. & E., 323 U.S. 210 (1944); the cases in note 74 supra. Cf.
Oliphant v. Brotherhood of L.F. & E., 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. z958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959),
holding that the antidiscrimination principle does not require admission to membership in the bargaining
agent where there was no finding that the exclusion resulted in actual discrimination in collective
bargaining.
"' Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
" Id. at 207.

" There is dictum in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953), suggesting that
the principle has general applicability.
00' Limited to racial discrimination: Colbert v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 2o6 F.2d 9 (9th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 931 (1954); Spires v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 F.2d 453 ( 4 th Cir.
1953); Alabaugh v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 222 F.2d 86I ( 4 th Cir. 1955); Brock v. Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters, x29 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. La. 1955). Not limited to racial discrimination: Cunningham v. Erie R.R. Co., 266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959); Mount v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 967 (1956); Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1953); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 360 (D.
Del. 1959); Cherico v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, x16 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also
Rose, The Railway Labor Act and jurisdiction of the Courts, 8 LAB. L.J. 9 (1957); Wellington, Union
Democracy and Fair Representation, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958); Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving
Union Democracy, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 6og (1959); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViLL. L. REV.
151 (1957).
' o The doctrine was applied in Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 469 (D. Del. 1958),
as a basis for asserting jurisdiction to review the award of a system board of adjustment where the union
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action for damages as an alternative remedy. 1 2 Without attempting to discuss in
detail these and related questions, it is enough to recognize that extreme complexity
exists where there should be great simplicity, and consideration of amendatory legislation would appear to be warranted. As one exasperated judge remarked recently :103
Whereas the discharged employee should be guided by simple procedures geared to
the sensitivities of his hardship, in reality he has been subjected to the rigors of a guessing
game. The difficulty is that the decision of the Supreme Court in Moore and its holding
in Koppal are, when served, barely digestible in the same system. Beyond that, it may
be asked whether the law has removed itself from the arena of common sense by adopting
in the upper reaches an unrealistic approach. To put the Socratic question, does the
employee who has been discharged, being thus of an uneven mind-hounded by the
realization of loss of job and support for his family for an indefinite period; overwhelmed
by the bigness of Organization-Union, Carrier-seemingly, and even actually, banded
against him; pressured by the increasing awareness he has so little time to act to seek
job restoration; and induced by the thought the Adjustment Board is the quickest, and
even sole, means of doing so-grasp for relief almost blindly ignorant in most cases of
his legal position? In any event, if indeed, a choice must be made, is that the selective
and measured act for which he is later to be judged and refused admittance in the court
house door?
One other question of general interest is the extent to which the Railway Labor
Act pre-empts substantive provisions of state law. Since the Railway Labor Act
contains no schedule of unfair labor practices such as that contained in the National
Labor Relations Act, 04 it might seem that greater latitude exists for the application
of state labor policy.'0 In Teamsters v. New York, New Haven & HartfordRR., '°
members of the board did not support the discharged employee's contention. In Bohannon v. Reading Co.,
i68 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Pa. x958), it was assumed that Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), establishes
a federal cause of action for "hostile discrimination" by a union in the processing of grievances. Two other
cases hold that adjustment board awards are inherently unfair and subject to judicial review when the
union members and representatives are antagonistic to the position of the grieving employee. See Edwards
v. Capital Air Lines, 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 885 ('949); Rychlik v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 48o (957).
Contra, Pigott
v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Ry. Co., 221 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 833 (1955).
Cf. Bower v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 214 F.2d 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
" There may be a state cause of action for discharge as an alternative to an adjustment board proceeding. Moore v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 312 U.S. 63o (194). If state law requires the prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies, however, the employee must comply with it by first seeking relief before
the appropriate adjustment board. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
But if, in such a proceeding, reinstatement or recomputation of earnings is sought, or seniority rights
are asserted, the adjustment board award is "final and binding," the board has exclusive primary jurisdiction, and there is no independent cause of action. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239
(i95o)
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Day, 37 CCH Lab. Cas.
65,56o (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1959); Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 255 (1950); Rose v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 37 CCH Lab.
Cas.
65,571 (8th Cir. 1959); Majors v. Thompson, 235 F.2d 449 (sth Cir. 1956). The jurisdiction
of the federal courts in discharge damage cases is based upon diversity of citizenship. Stack v. New
York Cent. Ry. Co., 258 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1958).
...Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 82, 87 (D. Del. 1957).
(Footnotes omitted.)
o § 8(a) and (b), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § i58(a), (b) (1952).
...See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
949 (1958).
See generally, Note, State Jurisdiction Over Torts Arising from Federally Cognizable
Labor Disputes, 68 YALE L. J. 3o8 (1958).
100350 U.S. 155 (1956).
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however, it was held that state law was pre-empted in the field of secondary
boycotts because of the protection in that field afforded to a railroad by the National
Labor Relations Act.
III
THE MUTUAL AID

PACT

On October 20, 1958, six air carriers-American Airlines, Capital Airlines, Eastern
United Air
Air Lines, Pan American World Airways, Trans World Airlines, 'and
7
Lines entered into what has been referred to as a "mutual aid pact.'
The agreement (which any certificated air carrier may join merely by signing and
filing a copy with the CAB) obligates each party "to pay over to the party suffering
[a] strike an amount equal to its increased revenues attributable to the strike during
the term thereof, less applicable added direct expense." The struck party agrees
"to provide the public with information concerning all air services rendered by the
other parties, and to direct to them as much of the traffic normally carried by the
party suffering such a strike as possible, all as the best interests of the members of the
public may require."ls
Those obligations arise, however, only if a strike resulting in a shutdown of
flight operations (a) is called "for reasons which include the enforcement of demands
in excess of or opposed to the recommendations of a [presidential emergency board]
and applicable to [the struck] party," or (b) is called "before the employees on
strike . . . have exhausted the procedures of the Railway Labor Act," or (c) "is
otherwise unlawful."'109
The agreement became effective immediately, but provided for filing with the
1
Otherwise the agreement was
CAB and termination if disapproved by the Board.
to terminate on October 2o, 1959, unless renewed."'
After the agreement had been filed with the CAB, January 14, 1959 was set as
the date for oral argument, and the carriers and unions were invited to participate.
10? Agreement CAB No. 12633 (1958)

[hereinafter cited as Agreement].

"' ld. §§ 1, 2, 3.
DId. § X.
110 § 412 of the Federal Aviation Act of X958, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1382 (Supp. 1959), which
carries over the provisions of § 412 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, requires that agreements between
carriers affecting air transportation and relating to various matters be filed with the CAB. The Board
is then required to approve such agreement if it finds it not to be adverse to the public interest or in
violation of the Act. The standards to be applied by the Board in considering the public interest are set
forth in § 102 of the Act. 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (Supp. 1959). Such approval exempts
the agreement from the antitrust laws. § 414, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1384 (Supp. 1959). The Act
makes the holding of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by an airline subject to compliance
with the Railway Labor Act. § 401(l), 72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (Supp. 1959). The most
nearly similar proceeding was in 1947, when the Board approved an air carriers' agreement to establish
an agency to conduct labor negotiations. See Airline Negotiating Conference, 8 C.A.B. 354 (1947). The
conference subsequently was abandoned by the airlines. It has been held that consideration of general
labor management policies is outside the scope of the Board's authority in administering the mail pay
program under § 406 of the Act. See American Overseas Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
212Agreement § 4. It was extended until Oct. 20, 196o by an amendment of Oct. 13, 1959.
10
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The Board indicated particular interest in the following five questions :112
i. Does the agreement violate any applicable provisions of the Railway Labor
Act?
2. Will the operation of the agreement improve or impair labor-management
relations in the industry?
3. Will the agreement discriminate in restraint of trade against other air carriers not parties to it?
4-What effect, if any, will the agreement have upon administration of the
mail-pay program?
5-What effect, if any, will the agreement have upon the extent of Government
participation in labor-management disputes?
The CAB also ordered the carriers to submit data concerning the operation of
the agreement. Principally called for were reports of subsidiary agreements and
arrangements, and the amount and calculation of strike losses and payments under
the agreement.1
As of this writing, the carriers have reported a total of $6,o51,527 paid under

the agreement" 4 for strikes totaling iio days.
The unions attacked the agreement chiefly on the grounds that it is (a) a combination to agree in advance that no negotiations will take place, but that the contractors will stand on the recommendations of an emergency board,"" and (b) an
attempt to impose industry-wide bargaining." 6
That the unions' charges were not true, the carriers argued, was indicated not
only by the terms of the agreement itself, but also by the events following its signing, which included offers by carriers in excess of emergency board recommendations. They also contended:
(a) That the agreement is fully consistent with and promotes the statutory
policies of the Railway Labor Act, because the obligations thereunder arise only if
the statutory procedures are violated," 7 or after they have been completed and
the union demands are inconsistent with the recommendations of a presidential
emergency board. Congress intended that such recommendations, although not
binding, should be persuasive as a basis for settlement rather than "flouted and
disregarded.""'
lSix Carrier Mutual Aid Pact Approval Proceedings, No. 9977, Order No. E-1323 3 , CAB, Dec. 4,

1958.
"a'Id., Order No. E-133o8, Dec. 22, 1958.
... Aviation Daily, May 22, 1959, P. 143. An arbitration award has been filed in Six Carrier Mutual
Aid Pact Approval Proceedings, No. 9977, Order No. E-1 4 897, CAB, Feb. 3, ig6o, holding American
entitled to payment under the Pact in connection with the pilots' strike, because it was called before
the procedures of the Railway Labor Act had been exhausted. American has received $3,372,205 pursuant
to the award. Aviation Daily, Feb. x9, 196o, p. 3o8.
...Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact Approval Proceedings, No. 9977, Brief of the International Association of Machinists and Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, CAB, 1959.
IId. at 6.
1
Id., Joint Brief of the Airline Parties, CAB, 1959, p. 16.
11 8
1d. at 19.
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(b) That interunion and intra-union cooperation are common practices, and
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." 9
(c) That "the basic problem is one of imbalance in labor-management relations." Because of the growth of union strength, the airlines have lost the economic capacity to deal individually with unions on equal terms' 2
(d) By virtue of the agreement, the airlines are able to use revenue which
ordinarily would be their own to bolster their weak economic position during
strikes. The agreement, therefore, will deter strikes.' 2 ' "When the balance of
power preponderates decisively in favor of the union, the temptation is great for the
union to obtain its demands by striking rather than engaging in serious collective
bargaining aimed at reconciling the interests of both parties' 2
The airlines also contended that the agreement would not inject the CAB into the
labor relations of the airline industry, that it was not inconsistent with the policies
of the antitrust laws, and that it would not pose problems in the administration of
the mail-pay program. 3
In a press release dated January 26, 1959, the CAB indicated its approval of the
agreement (by a four-to-one vote), and on May 20, 1959, its opinion was issued
(with a dissenting opinion by Board member Minetti) 124 Approval was "subject to
the following conditions":"
(a) The agreement should be amended by deleting clause 2 thereof, relating to routing
of traffic by a struck carrier party;
(b) The approval referred to above shall not affect the rights and obligations of the
parties, or of their employees, under the Railway Labor Act;
(c) The approval granted herein shall not be deemed a determination of the reasonableness of the financial provisions of the agreement for future rate-making or other
regulatory purposes under the Act.

It also required the parties to continue making reports concerning the operation of
the agreement.
In reaching its decision, the Board found, on the basis of the record before it, that
the agreement would not "constitute an impediment to bona fide collective bargaining,"' 20 "interfere with the prompt settlement of disputes,"' bring "into the dispute
carriers not parties thereto,"' 2 or violate the Railway Labor Act.'29 Nor would it
cause "such a disparity in economic power as to jeopardize the attainment of the
...Id.at 4-8 and app. B.
120 Id. at 4.
SId. TWA Supplemental Memorandum, CAB, Jan. 5, 1959, pp. 5-6.
22
I Joint Brief of the Airline Parties, CAB, 1959.
ld.

"'Id.at 27, 32, 42.
12,Id. Order No. E-13899, CAB, May 20,
"I Id.at
126 id. at
1"Ibid.
128 Id. at
"' Id. at

17-18.
5.
6.
8.

1959.
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statutory objectives

'

of the Federal Aviation Act of I958,'

"destroy workable

labor relations,"'132 or "substantially lessen competition within the air transportation
industry."' 33
In so deciding, the Board did not make "any determination as to whether the
agreement is a wise or beneficial step in the promotion of maximum harmony between labor and management, generally, or in air transportation in particular," since,
as a statutory matter, its approval was required by "the lack of any affirmative showing that the agreement is adverse to the objectives specified by Congress."'34
Deletion of the traffic-routing provision was required because the Board felt that
the public should be advised of travel facilities on the basis of passenger convenience
rather than carrier obligation and recognized that the provision "is not crucial to
the purpose of the agreement."' '
CONCLUSIONS

The Railway Labor Act's major dispute procedures have not been successful in
accomplishing their primary objective-i.e., the settlement of such disputes without

strikes. Some students, in fact, believe that the present statutory procedures actually
impede peaceful settlements. Whether that is true or not, the fact remains that
labor disputes in the recent past have been accompanied by a number of serious
airline strikes. The consequences of such strikes have been demonstrated, time and
time again, to be gravely injurious to the public interest in the uninterrupted transportation by air of persons, property, and mail. By forcing a complete shutdown
of operations, such strikes also commonly result in loss of pay by employees having
different bargaining representatives and, therefore, not concerned in the dispute.
Aside from whatever fundamental changes should be made in the major dispute
provisions of the Act, therefore, the public interest would seem to require at the
'"I Id. at io.

138 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp. 1958).

...Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact Approval Proceedings, No. 9977, Order No. E-i3899, CAB, May 20,
1959, p. U.
...Id. at 13.
54
' 1d. at 17.
5
Id. at 12.

This was accomplished by an amendment of June 5, 1959. In id. Order No. E-14 56 3 ,
CAB, Oct. 19, 1959, P. 5, the Board denied a union petition for reconsideration of its approval of the
mutual aid pact, stating: "The petition contains excerpts from the legislative history of the Railway
Labor Act in an attempt to show that the intent of Congress was hostile to agreements such as the one
before us. The congressional history, however, only confirms our original view that, in the Railway Labor
Act, Congress restricted the ambit of its proscription against compulsion to governmental action, and left
the parties free to engage in reciprocal tests of economic strength within the framework of collective
bargaining."
Wall Street journal, Sept. 23, 1959, P. 2, reported the formation of a "coordinating committee for
unions in the air transport industry" with a purpose of devising an answer to the mutual aid pact. A
union spokesman suggested that contracts be arranged to expire at about the same time, "so we can
have unified collective bargaining." The six unions involved are the Air Line Dispatchers Association,
the Air Line Pilots Association, the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the Flight Engineers International
Association, the International Association of Machinists, and the Transport Workers Union.
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very least that the privilege of resorting to strike action be preceded by and conditioned on a secret strike ballot in which an absolute majority of the employees
concerned reject (a) the carrier's last offer, (b) the NMB's proffer of arbitration,
and (c) the recommendations of a presidential emergency board, if any. If any
one of the three items listed above were not so rejected, the union involved should
not be permitted to resort to economic warfare. It seems obvious that such an election
should be conducted by a public agency after both sides-the union and management-have had a full opportunity to explain their positions to the employees.
Moreover, many who have had experience in the field-including this writerhave felt that strike action has been taken in some cases to accomplish objectives
which are not wholly in accord with either a sound system of air transportation or
the public interest. Jurisdictional and employee-qualification disputes fall into this
category. Such disputes should be settled by an agency charged with protecting the
public interest rather than by the pressures of collective bargaining or the balance
of economic power.
A further area for correction, important from an operational point of view, is the
harassment caused by threatened illegal strike action. When such threats are made,
management must take them seriously and prepare for them, whether or not the
unions mean them seriously. Operational uncertainty and cost result-particularly
when, as is frequently the case, such threats occur over holiday travel periods and
judges are not readily available to restrain them. Threats of illegal strike action
certainly can be no less damaging than defamatory statements. Persons making
libelous or slanderous statements have common-law liability for them, and it would
not seem unreasonable to hold unions making threats of illegal strikes answerable in
damages at the very least.
The minor-dispute procedures of the Railway Labor Act have been fairly successful in adjusting such disputes without resort to strike action, and the recent Chicago
River case'" 6 should further strengthen those procedures. They are subject to abuse,
however, and, where there is a will, there is a way to use them as an instrument of
harassment. Moreover, they are unsuitable for disposing of jurisdictional disputes
and troublesome problems where an individual grievance is asserted and the union
itself is antagonistic to the claim.
The role of the NMB is ambiguous. The Board has correctly recognized that its
primary role is mediatory, and it is probably right that the performance of certain
other functions-which, nevertheless, badly need to be performed-would interfere
with its effectiveness in mediation. Functions which perhaps might be performed
by a separate agency include settlement of jurisdictional disputes, bargaining-unit
determinations, and the conduct of representation elections.
The Railway Labor Act has been in operation for a sufficient period of time to
warrant legislative review in the light of experience under it. The clamor accom138 See supra note 90.
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panying recent airlines strikes is eloquent testimony to the public interest in such
13 7
review and the correction of statutory deficiencies
APPENDIX A
The following chart was introduced in evidence as TWA Exhibit No. 53 by Mr. John
P. Mead, Assistant Vice President of Personnel and Industrial Relations for Trans World
Airlines, Inc., in the proceedings before Presidential Emergency Board No. 22. See 25
That Board investigated the disputes between
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 2733 (958).

the International Association of Machinists and six air carriers.
modified to reflect the 1959 settlements.

The chart has been

COMPARISON OF TWA-IAM MECHANICS AND RELATED EMPLOYEES' WEIGHTED AVERAGE
STRAIGHT TIME PAY (EXCLUDING SHIFT PREMIUMS) WITH THE (x) CONSUMER PRICE
INDEX AND ANNUAL PRODUCTIVITY FACTOR, (2) TWA REVENUE PASSENGER MILE YIELD,
AND (3) TWA REVENUE TON MILE YIELD, 1948-1959
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i. The Mechanics and Related Employees' wages for the various years are shown as of January i (except

1948 which refers to wages after the April settlement).
2.The Consumer Price Index is as of January 15, 1948 and January 15, 1959; annual averages arc used
for the years 1948 through 1958.
3. The annual productivity factor used is 2.2. This is based on the BLS computation for 1go90-956.
4. The revenue yields are for January, 1948 and for the years 1948-1958. The increase indicated in March,
1958 is attributable to the temporary passenger fare increase of 4% plus si.oo for each ticket granted
by CAB in February. See Interim Fare Increase Case, No. 9288, Order No. E-12203, CAB, Feb. 25,
1958.
" Legislative review of the Railway Labor Act has been recommended from the standpoint of
the railroad industry. See Railroad Passenger Deficit, No. 31954, ICC, May 18, 1959, pp. 52, 103. On
the general subject of remedial legislation, see, MacIntyre, The Railway Labor Act-A Misfit for the
Airlines, 59 J. Ast L. & Co-m,. 274 (1952). It is suggested therein that the airlines be brought under
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

